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Abstract 
 
In this paper we integrate the dynamic models formulated by the 
microeconomic theory of trade unions and the differential games approach. 
We demonstrate that the results of  the dynamic monopoly union model, 
elaborated by Kidd and Oswald (1987) and Jones and McKenna (1994), can 
be obtained as solutions of a Stackelberg differential game between firms 
and unions under particular assumptions on union’s membership dynamic. 
We also develop a Nash differential game whose solutions imply a cycle in 
wage share of product and employment rate which resembles Goodwin’s 
(1967) cyclical growth path. This result is obtained by use of the Hopf  
theorem on local bifurcations, under particular hypotheses on the 
membership dynamics.  
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1. Introduction   
The dynamic extensions of the static models produced by the so-called  
microeconomic theory of trade unions (Kidd and Oswald, 1987; Gottfries 
and Horn, 1987; Jones, 1987; Jones and McKenna, 1994; Chiarini, 1996a) 
retain many essential elements of their static counterparts. In particular, 
trade unions keep on being depicted as an institutional device set up by a 
group of workers in order to turn income distribution to their favour by use 
of a bargain mechanism  (usually a Nash, or a form of monopolistic 
solution). However, when examined from other points of view, the dynamic 
approach to  trade unions enriches the static versions. For example, the law 
of motion describing the environment in which the agents act enables to 
endogenize union membership, a variable usually treated as a parameter in 
static models.  Furthermore, the equilibrium solutions of the dynamic 
models are generally characterised by smaller efficiency losses than those 
obtained in static models.  
                                                          
* Enrico Marchetti, Ph. D. University of Rome “La Sapienza”, Via del Castro Laurenziano 
9, 00161 Rome, Italy; e-mail: md3454@mclink.it. I am thankful to Bruno Chiarini, 
Giuseppe Ciccarone, Claudio De Vincenti,  and to the participants of the seminar at the 
Department of  Economic Policy, University “La Sapienza”. The usual disclaimer holds.  
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This differences notwithstanding, the most unsatisfactory aspect of 
trade unions models remains untouched, as the conflictual and strategic 
relationships between unions and firms still lack a systematic analysis. Most 
of the traditional dynamic models do not incorporate firms’ behaviour in an 
explicit way: firms reaction to union’s wage policy are rather considered as 
an environmental constrain faced by workers’ associations1. Moreover, it is 
not really clear whether the firms’ reaction function  (usually modelled as a 
standard labour demand curve) can be obtained in the same way as that of 
the union, i.e., assuming perfect information and rational behaviour in the 
intertemporal version.  
Since trade union models should be conceived as a simplified 
representation of  the distributive conflict taking place in noncompetitive 
labour markets, then it is realistic to consider that, in a particular labour 
market, firms will try to coordinate in some way their actions in order to 
respond to union’s wage policy. In this case, firms’ behaviour should not be 
taken so passive as in standard dynamic models: the possibility for the firms 
to condition union’s actions would probably yields different results. 
The lack of a thorough analysis of the strategic interplay between 
agents suggests to reformulate the dynamic monopoly union (DMU) models 
by employing the analytical apparatus provided by noncooperative game 
theory. This is our main motivation to move away from the standard DMU 
versions and to construct a series of dynamic games in continuous time 
between a union and a group of firms. This exercise will produce two main 
results.  
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Kidd an Oswald (1987) or Jones and McKenna (1994). 
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First, we will show that it is possible to formulate a Stackelberg 
differential game (with open loop information structure, and the union 
envisaged as the leader) which generates the same solutions as those of the 
standard DMU. This result heavily depends on the form of the differential 
equation representing the dynamic of union membership: if it is assumed to 
be linear in the wage, the employment and the level of the same 
membership, the correspondence exists; if a nonlinearity is instead inserted 
in the equation of motion, the same result can no longer be obtained.  
Second, it will be possible to develop a Nash (open loop) differential 
game which yields economically significant solutions (time paths for wage, 
employment and membership). These solutions define an attractor which is 
not an isolated steady state equilibrium point. We will demonstrate in fact 
that, for positive values of the discount rate (common to the firms and the 
union), a limit cycle emerges as a solution of the differential game, provided 
that the nonlinear part of the membership dynamics implies a strong 
“cumulativeness” in the unionisation process. Recalling  Goodwin’s (1967) 
analysis, growth cycles in the wage share of output and in the employment 
rate can hence be explained, if the process of membership formation exhibit 
the right features, in terms of strategies rationally chosen by capitalists 
(firms) and workers (union) in the intertemporal conflict over income 
distribution. 
A similar topic is tackled by Mehrling (1986), which examine the 
possible equilibria arising form the conflictual interaction of capitalists and 
workers treated as homogeneous classes. In that contribution four different 
(steady  state) equilibria are derived, each corresponding to different 
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assumptions about the degree to which each class is organised to promote its 
own interests. If a class is organised while the other is composed by agents 
who acts in an atomistic way, then the resulting steady state solution can be 
thought as a hierarchical equilibrium in which the first class of agents acts 
as a leader and the second class (the unorganised one) acts as a follower. 
Our approach differs form Mehrling’s in some important aspects; first, we 
will not consider explicitly capital accumulation in our games (the level of 
capital will be taken as given); second, the dynamic games developed in the 
subsequent sections derive directly form the dynamic monopoly union 
models, therefore we analyse the strategic interaction between capitalists 
(firms) and workers (unions) by adopting the guidelines offered by the 
microeconomic theory trade union behaviour. Furthermore, we will consider 
a labour market (or an entire economy) in which agents are strongly 
organised to promote their own interests.  
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 and 3 we focus on 
Stackelberg differential games in order to highlight the hypotheses which 
produce results equal to or different from those obtained in  traditional 
dynamic models. In section 4 we turn our attention to Nash differential 
games and in section 5 we discuss a particular differential game whose Nash 
equilibrium strategies imply cyclical paths for wages, employment and 
membership. To conclude, in section 6, we compare our results  with those 
generated by Goodwin’s (1967) model.  
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2. The monopoly union model as a differential game  
In the DMU models, the trade union  chooses the time path for wages 
which maximises the discounted flow of its utility under the constraint 
represented by the  dynamics (a differential equation) of union membership 
m whereas, in every period, firms determine employment n as a function of 
the value of wages ruling in the same period, w (Kidd and Oswald, 1987; 
Jones and McKenna, 1994; Chiarini, 1996a). Such a passive behaviour 
raises the question of whether it is indeed rational for the firms (which must 
optimise a discounted flow of profits in the same time span as that faced by 
unions) to adopt this kind of strategy. 
Dynamic games between trade unions and firms propose themselves 
as suitable approaches to tackle this issue. In particular they could be 
formulated with the aim of singling out the hypotheses on information and 
the  sequential structure of agents’ actions that could allow dynamic games 
to produce the same results as those generated by the DMU model. And yet 
the dynamics of membership and the associated problems are not explicitly 
dealt with by the existing attempts to transform trade unions models into 
dynamic games (Espinosa and Rhee, 1988; Mulder and Van Der Ploeg, 
1987; Van Der Ploeg, 1987). Keeping at distance from the current literature, 
we will try to integrate these two approaches by reformulating the DMU 
model in terms of a differential game and by explicitly considering the 
dynamics of union membership.  
The essential elements of such a game can be summarised into four 
items. First,  the aim of each players is to maximise, in every instant, the 
sum of his payoffs; the control variables are w(t) for the trade union and n(t) 
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for the firms. Their strategies are therefore explicitly modelled. Second, for 
the sake of simplicity, we will assume that the informative structure is of an 
open loop type: for every instant of time which has been reached, t ∈ ∞[ , )0 , 
each player knows only the initial state of the system m0 , the instant t , and 
the time path of his own control variable. Third,  the open loop informative 
structure simplifies the determination of the strategies' space, which in this 
case coincides with the set of feasible actions, i.e. with the possible 
functions w(t) and n(t). Fourth, the structure of interaction between the 
agents in the DMU model suggests to rely on the notion of Stackelberg 
equilibrium (in global strategies), and to conceive, in every instant, the 
union as the leader and firms as followers. In fact, in the DMU scheme there 
is a high level of market power held by the union (which acts as a 
monopolist): it has the complete control on the wage level; in this setting 
appears then reasonable to assume that the union has also a hierarchical 
predominance in the structure of the interaction with the firm, and so can 
enjoy of the advantage of “moving first”. The union will decide the wage 
level taking account of  the reactions of the firm to his wage policy, in terms 
of  employment levels, while the firm will formulate his decisions taking as 
given the wage policy adopted by the union. Practically, we analyse a 
modification of the original DMU scheme, in which firms are allowed to 
respond strategically to the wage policy set by the union2. 
If w(t) is taken as given, the problem of the follower can be treated as 
a standard problem of optimal control: 
                                                          
2  The noncooperative differential game approach can offer useful insights also in the case 
of the dynamic Nash bargaining, in which the union and the firm determine wage and 
employment time paths in a cooperative way (see Marchetti 1998b). 
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 [ ]dtwnnpfeJ tftn −= ∫
∞
− )(max
0
)(
δ                                 (1)   
s.t. &m n m= −                                                             (2) 
       m m( )0 0=  
 
where m is the membership level, f n( )  - with ′ > ′′ <f f0 0,  - is a single-
input (labour) production function and δ  is a discount rate. The form of 
equation (2) implies the  post entry closed shop hypothesis: in the labour 
market there exists an automatic mechanism which ensures that all 
employed workers are union members; whoever loses his/her job leaves the 
union in the following period. It is interesting to note that, in the case of  the 
post entry closed shop hypothesis, m can only diminish or remain constant; 
in this case, the strategy space of the firm is [ ]mn ,0∈ , for the closed shop 
implies that in each instant the constraint  mn ≤  must hold. Denoting with 
λf   the costate variable of the follower, the Hamiltonian of this problem is: 
 
[ ]{ }H e pf n wn n mf t f= − + −−δ λ( ) ( )    
 
from which we obtain the necessary condition for a maximum: 
 
[ ]e pf n wt f− ′ − + =δ λ( ) 0                                    (3) 
&m n m= −                                        
&λ λf f=                                                               (4) 
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 lim ( )
t f
t
→∞
=λ 0                                                      (5) 
 
The unique continuous function )(tfλ  which satisfies both (4) and (5) is the 
solution 0)( =tfλ  [ )∀ ∈ ∞t 0, . In this case the firms decisional rule assumes 
a very simple form; in fact, by substituting this result into (3), we get: 
 
[ ]pf n w′ − =( ) 0                                                      
 
or: 
 
pf n w′ =( )       [ )∞∈∀ ,0t  
 
This means that the firms behaves in the same way in the dynamic and in 
the static  situation: in both cases it determines n in such a way as to 
equalise wage and marginal productivity of labour (firms formulate a 
normal labour demand curve). 
The trade union's problem is of a different nature: acting as a leader, in 
determining its optimal strategy, the union will have to consider the optimal 
reactions of the follower - as defined by (3)-(5) - in every instant of time. 
We assume that the union has an instantaneous utility function of utilitarian 
type U t nu w m n u b( ) ( ) ( ) ( )= + − , with ′ > ′′ <u u0 0,  and where b represents 
the reservation income. The union's control problem is thus3: 
                                                          
3  In this case we need to carry the firm’s costate variable trough the leader’s optimisation 
problem; see Bašar Olsder (1995). 
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 { }dtbunmwnueJ tutw )()()(max
0
)(
−+= ∫∞ −δ     (6) 
s.t.  [ ]e pf n wt f− ′ − + =δ λ( ) 0                 (3) 
       &m n m= −                                                       
       &λ λf f=         (4) 
        lim ( )
t f
t
→∞
=λ 0       (5) 
 
As (3)-(5) imply that pf n w′ =( ) , this optimisation problem coincides with 
the  monopoly union problem discussed in Kidd and Oswald (1987): 
 
 { }dtbunmwnueJ tutw )()()(max
0
)(
−+= ∫∞ −δ             
s.t.  pf n w′ =( )     
       &m n m= −                                                       
        
The dynamical system, which can now be obtained in the standard manner, 
exhibits an unstable steady state equilibrium point (a saddle point): 
 
[ ])()()1(
/)(
1 bun
dnnd
n δβδβ −+=&              
mnm −=&        (7) 
 
[ ]ufunn +′′′=)(β  
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The equilibrium values at the steady state are m*=n*, 
)(
1
*)( bun
δ
δβ
+
= and 

 


+
′=
− )(
1
* 1 bufpw
δ
δβ . The result we reach is 
that, if we assume the informative structure is open loop and take (2) as 
equation of motion, the DMU may indeed be interpreted as a Stackelberg 
differential game between firms and the trade union. 
Since equilibrium solutions in Stackelberg games can be time 
inconsistent, the question arises of whether the optimal strategy representing 
the solution of system (7) is in fact time consistent.  One method of 
ascertaining time inconsistency is to set the multiplier of the constraint (4) 
in the Hamiltonian of the union’s optimisation problem equal to zero, to 
solve the problem of the leader, and to check whether the strategies 
calculated in this way are incompatible with the necessary optimum 
conditions (for both players) of the original game. Applying this method to 
our case, it is trivial to verify that the strategies thus obtained are the same; 
the equilibrium strategies representing the solutions to system (7) are hence 
time consistent. 
 
 
3. Nonlinear equation of motion and the DMU 
In the previous section, we have shown that the DMU can be 
rationalized as a differential game. We now wish to prove that this 
correspondence is not robust with respect to changes in the hypotheses made 
by the DMU in its basic version. In particular, if equation (2) is modified, 
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for instance by adding other variables - as, for example, in Jones and 
McKenna (1994) - the results of the differential game no longer coincide 
with those of the modified DMU4. 
To show this we formulate a Stackelberg differential game which 
retain the open loop information structure and the follower role for the 
firms, but which incorporates a more general equation of motion: 
& ( )m n m kw= + +θ φ . The parameter 0>θ  represents the positive effects on 
the membership’s rate of growth due to a greater employed labour force. 
Parameter k>0 implies that workers, in their decisions on whether to join or 
not the union, take count of the latter’s achievements in wage claims: if 
union gains high wages, more workers will decide to join the union. This 
behaviour can be seen as a phenomenon opposite to the free riding: the more 
the workers’ organisation succeed in pursuing the members’ (wage) 
objectives, the more this same organisation will collect consent among 
potential participants. Function )(mφ  describes how the absolute level of 
membership affects the rate of growth of the same membership. These 
assumptions allows to drop the closed shop hypothesis5 so that the players’ 
strategy spaces will be different form those assumed in the  closed shop 
model; the union will choose the wage so that [ ]Wbw ,∈ , where W is the 
                                                          
4 More precisely, the equation of motion must contain some nonlinearities. In fact, if the 
differential equation representing the open shop membership dynamics is linear, then the 
Stackelberg differential game yields exactly the same results as the corresponding DMU. 
See footnote 6, below. 
5 This equation of motion is an approximation of  that derived by Jones and McKenna 
(1994) from an explicit consideration of the workers' optimal choice with respect to the 
joining of the union. They assume that 0>θ  and 0>k , while ′φ  can be either positive 
or negative. In this scheme, in order to definitely drop the closed shop hypothesis, we must 
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maximum achievable level of wage6, while the admissible strategy space for 
the firms will be the interval [ ]N,0 , where N is the full employment level. It 
is worth underlining that mN > , for we assume an open shop labour 
market; the unemployment rate can then be defined as (N-n)/N. The firms 
optimisation problem is: 
 
[ ]dtwnnpfeJ tftn −= ∫
∞
− )(max
0
)(
δ                                                           (8) 
s.t. & ( )m n m kw= + +θ φ                                                                        (9) 
    m m( )0 0=    
 
and the corresponding Hamiltonian is:      
 
[ ]{ }H e pf n wn n m kwf t f= − + + +−δ λ θ φ( ) ( ( ) )   
 
from which the following first order conditions are obtained: 
 
[ ]e pf n wt f− ′ − + =δ λ θ( ) 0                                                                (10) 
ff λφλ ′−=& ,               lim ( )t f t→∞ =λ 0 
 
The leader's problem can be written as:  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
assume that the wage determined by the union is valid for all the workers of the sector, not 
only for union  members. 
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{ }dtbunmwnueJ tutw )()()(max
0
)(
−+= ∫∞ −δ                                          (11)         
s.t.   & ( )m n m kw= + +θ φ  
       [ ]e pf n wt f− ′ − + =δ λ θ( ) 0                             
      &λ φ λf f= − ′  
       lim ( )
t f
t
→∞
=λ 0 
 
The Hamiltonian in this case is: 
 
{ }
[ ]
H e nu w m n u b n m kw
e pf n w
u
t
u f
t
f
= + − + + + + − ′ +
+ ′ − +
−
−
δ
δ
λ θ φ γ λ φ
ν λ θ
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ( )
( ( ) )
  
  
where γ  is a parameter which depends on time and ν  is a parameter 
independent of time. The first order conditions are: 
 
[ ]e pf n wt f− ′ − + =δ λ θ( ) 0 
&λ φ λf f= − ′                        
&γ γφ νθ= ′−  
[ ]e nu w kt u− ′ − +δ ν λ( )  
& ( )λ λ φ γλ φδu t u fe u b= − − ′− ′′−  
γ ( )0 0=      m m( )0 0=       lim ( )t f t→∞ =λ 0     lim ( )t u t→∞ =λ 0 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
6  Presumably nnpfW /)(= , i.e. at the maximum level of wage the profit is zero.  
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Since this is a so-called ‘two point boundary value problem’7, the solution 
can only be found by use of numerical methods; in general, it is however 
likely that the solution turns out to be different from that of the 
corresponding DMU model8. This fundamental difference between games 
(8)-(11) and (1)-(6) is essentially due to the form of the membership 
dynamics (besides the open loop information structure). If these dynamics 
are expressed by a linear equation  (in n,m,w) such as (2), the value of m for 
the firms (represented by λf ) is zero for every t; firms' optimal behaviour 
would be therefore to adapt itself to the union's wage policy, i.e., to react to 
w according to pf n w′ =( )  ∀t . Some kind of nonlinearity in (2) is instead 
sufficient to make λf ≠ 0. If λf  is zero for every t, this means that the 
shadow price of membership is zero for the firms: the latter attribute no 
importance to the possibility of affecting the union’s wage strategy by 
means of the control of m’s time path, exerted via n. The linear form of 
equation (2) implies that the effect of m on the growth rate of the same 
membership is too weak to make it convenient for the firms to condition 
their employment policy to the control of m in order to force the union to 
lower wages. The latter strategy becomes convenient for the firms only 
                                                          
7 See for instance Intriligator (1971).  
8As mentioned in footnote 3, if the membership dynamics are taken to be linear - as in the 
case of  &m n m kw= − +θ φ  - the Stackelberg differential game yields exactly the same 
results as the corresponding DMU. In this case, the follower's optimal control problem 
leads to the differential equation in the costate variable: ff φλλ =& , this equation, together 
with the terminal condition on fλ , implies 0=fλ . The leader's problem, which takes 
these conditions as constraints, generates the same differential equations as those of a DMU 
version having  &m n m kw= − +θ φ  as its equation of motion. 
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when the effect of m on &m  is strong enough, e.g. when there is some kind of 
nonlinearity, such as )(⋅φ , in the membership dynamics   
 
 
4. Nash games 
The switching from equation (2) to equation (9) yields further 
consequences, as it also enables the formulation of a game characterised by 
a different decision structure, i.e., a Nash differential game. Relying again 
on open loop information, the problem can be set up by assuming that, at the 
initial instant t=0, players choose their strategies for the whole time span, 
and that they reach their decisions taking their opponent's strategy as given. 
Although less rich than the Stackelberg one (because the union behaves 
more myopically), the Nash structure however is much more analytically 
tractable.  
We will adopt a particular specification of the equation (9): 
 
kwmnm ++= )(ln φθ&                (12) 
 
which differs form (9) only in the term nlnθ 9. We also assume, for 
simplicity, that  the production function is linear in n: f(n)=An, A>0. In this 
case firms' problem will be expressed by:   
 
                                                          
9 This specification is adopted only for analytical tractability and it doesn’t imply 
conceptual differences with the (9); in fact the sign of the impact of n on membership’s 
variation m& remains positive. 
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( )dtwnpAneJ tutn −= ∫
∞
−
0
)(
max δ          
s.t.   kwmnm ++= )(ln φθ& ,       m m( )0 0=    
 
From the Hamiltonian ))(ln()( kwmnwnpAneH f
t
f +++−=
− φθλδ  we 
can calculate the first order conditions of the problem: 
 
n
wpAe
n
H
f
tf θλδ +−=
∂
∂
− )(  
ff
f
m
H
λφλ ′−==
∂
∂
−
& , 0lim =
∞→
ft
λ  
 
After some manipulation we obtain an equation of the wage change rate: 
 
[ ]nnnwpA
n
w && +−′−= δφ)((1  
 
The problem for the union is: 
 
 { }dtbunmwnueJ tutw )()()(max
0
)(
−+= ∫∞ −δ          
s.t.   kwmnm ++= )(ln φθ&        m m( )0 0=    
 
its Hamiltonian - { } ))(ln()()()( kwmnbunmwnueH urtu +++−+= − φθλ  - 
implies: 
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[ ]e nu w kt u− ′ + =δ λ( ) 0 
& ( )λ λ φδu t ue u b= − − ′−  
 
Differentiating the first of these equations with respect to t and substituting 
the result in the second equation, we obtain: 
 
& & ( ) ( )nu nu w nu ku b′ + ′′ = − ′− ′+φ δ  
 
The dynamical system resulting from the two optimal control problems can 
hence be expressed as: 
 
  
( ) kwmnm
bkuwfp
wn
w
n
w
bkun
++=
−′=
−
′
−=
φθ
η
δφ
η
ln
)()(
)(
1
)(
)(
)(
&
&
&
      (13)   
 
where uwpAuw ′′−+′= )()(η . The steady state values of w, n and m are: 
 
pAw =* ;      
u
bkun
′−′
=
)(
)(*
δφ ;    *)ln*(*)( nkwm θφ +−=  (14) 
 
The second of equations (14) implies that the steady state values of this 
game are generally different from those of the corresponding DMU version 
(see footnote 3). Furthermore, (14) implies that during the adjustment 
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process the values of wage and employment can be different from those 
implied by the labour demand curve. n and w are certainly set according to 
the demand of labour when firms and the union reach the steady state. 
 
 
5. Optimal strategies and wage-employment cycles 
In order to study the dynamics of system (13) we have to calculate its 
linearization in a neighbourhood of the point E=(n*,w*,m*), which is given 
by: 
 
   








−
−
−










′
′
−
′′
−−
′
−
=








*)(
*)(
*)(
*
0
*
)(0
*0)(
mm
ww
nn
k
n
nu
bku
n
m
w
n
φθ
φδφ
&
&
&
                           (15) 
 
from the characteristic equation we get: 
 
[ ] 0)))(((
*
)(
=′′+′−−′+


′
+ φθφδφ rr
nu
bkur  
 
so as to obtain the eigenvalues ri , i=1,2,3 as: 
 
       
*
)(
1 nu
bkur
′
−=         (<0 in the equilibrium point) 
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[ ]
2
)(42
3/2
δφφφθδδ −′′−′′−±
=r  
 
Although a casual analysis of such eigenvalues does not allow to draw 
definite conclusions on the local stability of system (13), or on the 
qualitative characteristics of the equilibrium point (the signs of r2 3/  depend 
on the various coefficients in a complicated way), we can try to establish 
whether system (13) possesses attractors qualitatively different from a fixed 
point by applying some results of the local theory of bifurcations (cfr. 
Lorenz, 1993; Medio, 1993; Arnold, 1988; Guckenheimer and Holmes, 
1983). In particular, we will make use of the Hopf theorem to determine 
whether (13) includes closed orbits (cycles) among its possible solutions, 
and whether one of these is actually an attractor (a limit cycle). 
The Hopf theorem can be easily summarised (Hassard, Kazarinoff e 
Wan, 1981): 
 
Part I (existence). If: (i) the dynamical system & ( , )x F x= ξ , F C L∈ , 
x n∈ℜ , where ξ ∈ℜ is a parameter, has an isolated equilibrium point at x* 
, (ii) for the critical value ξ , the Jacobian matrix ∂ ξ ∂F x x( *, ) /  possesses 
two pure imaginary eigenvalues r i( )ξ ω= ± , while all other eigenvalues are 
negative, and (iii)      
[ ]d r
d
Re ( )ξ
ξ ξ ξ=
> 0 then for ξ  belonging to a 
neighbourhood of ξ  , the system & ( , )x F x= ξ  possesses a periodic solution. 
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Part II (bifurcation direction and stability): if  
 
[ ]ξ ξ ξ ξ2 1 1 0= − >−Re ( ) Re ( ) /c d r d  
 where c i r g g g g
g
1
1
20 11 11
2
02
2 212 2
1
3 2
( ) ( Im ( ))ξ ξ= − −

 +
−   
 
then the periodic solution emerges for ξ ξ> ; furthermore if 
β ξ2 12 0= <Re ( )c  the periodic solution is stable and is a limit cycle10. 
 
In the case of system (13) we take δ  as a parameter and let 0=δ  be 
the critical value; thus we have: 
 
  ))(( 23/2 φφθ ′−′−=r  
  
Furthermore we have: 
 
 
[ ]d r
d
Re ( )0 1
2
0
δ
δ =
=  
 
Assuming that 0>′′φ  and 0>′φ , the conditions of Part I of Hopf theorem 
will be satisfied if φ
φθ
′′
′
>
2
; in this case a periodic solution of (13) exists for 
                                                          
10 A synthesis of the proof of the theorem and the procedure used to calculate the 
coefficients g can be found in the Appendix. 
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a δ  in a neighbourhood of zero. Condition φ
φθ
′′
′
>
2
 implies that the second 
order derivative of )(mφ  must be not only positive but greater than the first 
derivative of the same function. 
As for direction and stability, we must calculate the coefficient c1 0( ) . 
By putting  ωφφθ =′−′′ ))(( 2  we obtain (see the Appendix): 
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with the derivatives of φ  and the value of ω  calculated at point E. 
According to Part II of the Hopf theorem, we have: 
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From the last expression we can see that if: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0
3
21214813
8
1
22
4222
<
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 +′−+′−++−− ′
ωθ
ωφωωφθωωωθωθ φB  
 
then the periodic solution is economically significant, as it emerges when 
δ > 0. In this case, it is also stable, so as to propose itself as a limit cycle 
attracting all the other trajectories. The previous expression is negative if its 
numerator is negative, as its denominator 223 ωθ  is positive. The numerator 
sign depends in a complicated way on the relative size of the parameters; we 
can however examine an interesting case. Let’s consider these two 
hypotheses: φ ′′′  is very small (zero on the limit) and 01<−ω , i.e. 
12 <′−′′ φφθ . In this case the denominator will be likely negative, as all its 
terms would be negative, apart form the positive addendum φω ′42 .  
The emerging of limit cycle as a consequence of the players’ optimal 
strategies heavily depends on the sign of the derivatives of φ  :φ′  and φ ′′  
must be positive and 0→′′′φ . Combining the condition for existence with 
those for stability, a relation between φ  ‘s derivatives and parameter θ  can 
be obtained: we have a limit cycle when: 
 
φ
φθφ
φ
′′
′+
<<
′′
′
22 1                 (17) 
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A possible interpretation of this result implies two distinct observations. 
First, being 0>′φ  and 0>′′φ , there must be a kind of strong 
"cumulativeness" of dynamic law (12); function φ   represents in fact the 
impact that the level of membership has on its own growth rate, and the first 
three positive derivatives of φ  imply that this impact increases with 
increasing rates (and with constant rate variations, as 0→′′′φ ). Second, the 
constraint imposed by (17) implies that the impact of the membership level 
(represented by the derivatives of φ ) on m&   is somehow balanced by the 
impact of the employment level (represented by θ ) on the same rate: these 
two effects must be partially compensating. 
A careful inspection of system (13) offers an economic interpretation 
of the cyclical process implied by these equations. Starting from a wage 
level which is lower than marginal productivity and from quite a high 
membership level, the second of equations (13) makes clear that it will be 
convenient for the union to raise wages ( &w  is positive) in order to gain a 
higher share of product11. The effect on m produced by the raise in w is 
described by (12). A growing wage level implies (via the coefficient k) an 
increase in union participation: workers will tend to join the union due to its 
success in wage claims. The increase in m causes a growth of the term 
′ −φ δ  (since ′φ >0) which, in its turn, induces firms to reduce employment: 
the first of equations (13) shows that there exists a certain point at which &n  
will be negative for a growing m. The decrease of n will eventually 
                                                          
11  The fact that the wage can be different form marginal productivity can induce some 
confusion, considering that we are dealing with profit-maximizing firms. Anyway, in a 
dynamic game there can be some reason for firms to fix n not to equate marginal 
productivity to wage. Infact, is the strategic interaction in a dynamic context that pushes 
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influence equation (12) (via the coefficient θ ) inducing negative growth 
rates of m. At this stage, due to the strong cumulativeness of (12) in m, the 
membership will keep diminishing at an accelerated rate, until it reaches a 
level such that ′ −φ δ  is negative. When this happens, the best thing the 
union can do, in the face of excessively reduced employment and 
membership, is to restrain its wage claims12. When the decrease in w, 
together with ′ −φ δ  <0, induces an increase of n, this growth in 
employment persists until &m in (12) becomes positive; this will cause an 
increase in ′ −φ δ  until it returns to a positive value, thus inducing the union 
to increase w once again. 
Equation (12) represents a constraint on the union's possibility of 
imposing wage claims, as it shows that the value of wages and employment 
have an influence on union’s size, which affects directly union’s utility U(t). 
The process described above can be exploited by firms who, by 
manoeuvring employment, can reduce membership until the union is forced 
to reduce wages; a device able to discipline industrial relations via 
membership is thus activated.  It is worth underlining that the existence of 
this mechanism is conditioned by the institutional (and/or historical) 
characteristics of the unionisation phenomenon experienced in a given 
economy, as expressed by  function φ  and by parameter θ . 
In particular, it is important to investigate on the nature of function 
)(mφ . It represent the impact exerted by the absolute dimension of the 
union on the time variation of the membership. It then represent the 
                                                                                                                                                   
firms to act in such a way, in order to inlfuence thet union’s wage policy. 
12  In fact, in a neighbourhood  of the steady state we have: )(/)()( wnbku ηδφ =−′ . 
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institutional characteristics of the autonomous consolidation process of the 
union’s internal organisation, indicating how the union as an organisation 
can expand (or maintain) is dimension by means of internal resources. This 
process, owing to the institutional complexities which characterise the 
aggregation and the consolidation of the workers’ consent, can manifest 
strong nonlineraities. For instance, if the internal resources that the union 
can activate in order to enforce its unity and to gather consent grow strongly 
with the union’s dimension, then the  first and second derivatives of 
function )(mφ can be both positive. 
 Parameter δ  also plays a crucial role. Not only does the existence of 
the limit cycle depend on this parameter, but it also conditions the union's 
incentive for wage growth: the greater is δ , the sooner will the union be 
driven to moderate its wage claims and the more convenient it will be for 
the firms to support the level of employment. When a high value is attached 
to the future, more importance is attributed by the union to the employment 
aim than to the wage objective. 
Finally, the emergence of the limit cycles depend also on the exitence 
of a kind of wage effect, represented by parameter k. In fact, if k=0, the 
necessary optimality condition for the union’s problem becomes 
[ ]e nu w kt u− ′ + =δ λ( ) 0, which implies that the union choice is a constant wage 
level: w=W , t∀ . If the membership dynamics (12) doesn’t depend on w, 
the union is not sufficiently stimulated to restrain from a high wage policy.  
It is important to note that the emerging of a limit cycle as a solution 
of system (13) heavily depends on the hypotheses made on the informative 
structure. The form of equations (13) depends on the fact that in the 
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information sets of the players there are only the initial value of the state 
variable ( 0m ) and the calendar date. This implies that the players are not 
able to observe the past actions, once those are effectively implemented. We 
can also say that there is a kind of precommitment: each player commit 
himself to follow the strategy which he chooses at the beginning of the 
game, knowing the initial information on the actions available to his 
opponent.  
Under less restrictive assumptions on the information available to the 
players, the equilibrium strategies which solves the game of section 4 could 
be quite different. For instance, if we adopt a closed loop informative 
structure, in which each player knows the past actions undertaken by his 
opponent, the final result can be much more complex. In this setting each 
player can learn by observing the past, and then evaluate on these basis the 
behaviour of the opponent. This could constitute an incentive for the players 
to adopt policies based, for instance, on cooperation. In this case, firms and 
unions could achieve final trajectories which pareto-dominate the cycles of 
system (13)13. In particular, under appropriate assumptions on the 
parameters values, the players could agree to play a strategy which 
maximise the sum of the two payoff functionals, so to solve the prisoner’s 
dilemma which characterise the union-firm dynamic game. 
Unfortunately, the adoption of more complex informative structure 
bears a high degree of difficulty in the solution procedure of the differential 
games. With information structures different from the open loop case, 
differential games gets in general analytically untractable, with the 
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exception of some particular cases. For example, if we adopt a memoryless 
perfect state information structure for the game of section 4, then the players 
know, in addition to the initial value of m and to the calendar date, also the 
value of the state variable at the present time m(t). This implies that the 
strategy spaces and the action spaces of the players no more coincide. The 
strategy of each player is now not only a function of time, but also a 
function of the state variable, so that system (13) becomes a system of 
partial differential equations, which can generally be solved only by means 
of numerical methods. 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The explicit introduction of the strategic interaction between agents 
not only notably modifies the outcome of the dynamic models - in the sense 
that the dynamics of system (7) are qualitatively different from the 
dynamics of system (13) - but also enables us to establish connections with 
models and theories belonging to other areas of research.  
A model whose outcome is similar to that of system (13) is the well 
known Goodwin’s (1967, 1991) model, where the dynamics is of the 
predator-prey type: the Lotka-Volterra differential equations, used to 
represent the distributive conflict between capitalists and workers, generate 
a cyclical solution in the wage share of income and in the employment rate. 
In that case, the wage dynamics, which are taken as given, represent a 
                                                                                                                                                   
13  For an attempt to investigate the pareto-efficiency of games such those of section 4 see 
Marchetti (1998). 
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disciplinary device operating within the labour market, one of the two 
equations of the model being in fact a Phillips curve.  
System (13) also generates a stable cycle in the wage share of 
products and in the employment rate14, even if the closed orbit is not 
necessarily identical to that produced by the Goodwin’s model. In fact, 
Goodwin’s model implies a different description of the economic structure: 
it is assumed that aggregate production is characterised by fixed coefficients 
in employment and capital, and that there is an exogenous rate of technical 
progress. Capitalists reinvest all their profits in the capital stock so to 
enlarge productive capacity and effective demand, while workers spend all 
their income in consumption. The cyclical behaviour of the system arises 
because a high level of profits and investment increases the capital stock and 
employment (because of the Leontiev technology) The increase in 
employment induces an increase in wages, via a kind of Phillips curve 
mechanism. The subsequent growth in wage share produces a reduction in 
profits which worsen capitalists’ investment perspectives. This reduces the 
growth of production and increases the unemployment rate, which in turn 
restore, via a decrease in wages, favourable profitability conditions for 
investments.  
System (13) implies a different interpretation of the underlying 
economic structure. The basic scheme of interaction between firms and 
unions is still grounded in a supply-oriented vision of the economic process, 
but there is no explicit consideration of the accumulation process, the capital 
stock being considered as given. Unemployment emerges only as a 
                                                          
14 Given the hypothesis on the production function, the wage share is equal to pAw / . 
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consequence of the market power of the agents and of their ability to control 
the price variables (wage). System (13) then describes an economy in which 
there isn’t a real economic growth. so that its limit cycles should be properly 
considered as short term economic oscillation, rather than “growth cycles” 
in the Goodwin’s sense. In our case, however, the time path of wage and 
employment represents the equilibrium of a dynamic game. The periodic 
orbit of  system (13) can be seen as an example of the theoretical possibility 
that a problem of optimal control possesses a cyclical solution, rather than 
the more common saddle point solution. Benhabib and Nishimura (1979) 
showed this possibility for a multisectoral model of optimal growth; in our 
case, however, the periodic orbit is not simply the result of the optimal 
program of a single agent which acts in a parametrical environment, but is 
the consequence of  maximising strategies chosen by players which take 
count of the strategic interdependence of their actions. Stable periodic 
solutions can emerge as consequence of rational behaviour also in this kind 
of economic environment 
In the context of our Nash game, it is conceivable that the union, 
which represents a significant percentage of workers, should face an 
intertemporal problem of strategic nature: if the union increases wages for a 
certain period, the sum of the workers' utilities will also increase; in the 
subsequent period, the union will however experience a drop in employment 
and in membership which has a negative impact on the global level of its 
utility. Firms face a similar problem. At the beginning, they can expand 
production and profits by setting a high level of employment, but this 
encourages the trade union to incerease the wage. It is then convenient for 
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the firms to reduce employment so as to decrease union membership and put 
a check on wage growth. 
This scheme may be interpreted as an argument, different from those 
already present in literature (Lancaster, 1973; Hoel, 1978; Pohjola, 1984a 
and 1984b) in support of the dynamic inefficiency of a capitalist economy 
emerging from the distributive conflict between different groups of agents. 
When the Nash differential game presented in section 4 is interpreted along 
this lines, the resulting cyclical path, which represents the process through 
which the distributive conflict develops, may indeed be conceived as the 
consequence of rationally chosen strategies, and hence of the optimal 
behaviour that should be espoused by individual agents.  
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
We start by assuming that the conditions of Part I of the Hopf theorem 
are satisfied for the system in the generic form & ( , )x F x= ξ , and that this 
system can be written as: 
 
& ( ) ( , )X A X f X= +ξ ξ ,   X x x= − *,   A F x x( ) ( *, ) /ξ ∂ ξ ∂=          (A.1) 
 
where  f( ) is a polynomial in x and where the terms have order greater than 
or equal to 2. The aim of the proceeding is to facilitate the study of system 
(A.1) by lowering its dimension.  
This can be done by applying the centre manifold theory according to 
which a centre manifold is a subset (of smaller dimension) of the phase 
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space of (A.1) spanned by the eigenvalues of A with zero real part. Since the 
other eigenvalues of A are negative, instead of the whole system (A.1), we 
can study only the dynamics taking place in the centre manifold. To do so, 
the "reduced" system must be expressed in a form known as the Poincarè 
normal form.  This requires to approximate the function defining the centre 
manifold. 
Define the variables: 
 
z t q x t( ) *, ( )=  
 
and    v t x t z t q z t q x t zq( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Re( )= − − = − 2  
 
where q and q* are the eigenvectors of A corresponding to the two complex 
eigenvalues r( )ξ ; x(t) is a generic solution of (A.1); .,.  denotes the 
Hermitian product and the underlined variables are the conjugate of the 
original (complex) variables.  Using the variables z and v, (A.1) can be 
expressed as: 
 
& ( ) ( , , , )
& ( ) ( , , , )
z r z G z z v
v A v H z z v
= +
= +
ξ ξ
ξ ξ                                                                  (A.2) 
 
where: 
 
( )G q f v zq= +*, ( Re( ), ) ,2 ξ  ( )H f v zq qG= + −( Re( ), ) Re( )2 2ξ  
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System (A.2) has n+2 variables, but two of them are a linear 
combination of the others. 
A function v v z z= ( , , )ξ  describing the centre manifold can be derived 
from the second equation of (A.2). Substituting this function into the first 
equation of (A.2), we get:  
 
& ( ) ( , , )z r z g z z= +ξ ξ                                                                      (A.3)                                    
 
where g z z G z z v z z( , , ) ( , , ( , ), )ξ ξ= . We now have to calculate the 
coefficients of g and v (approximating v with a second order Taylor series 
expansion). It can be shown (Hassard et al., 1981, pp. 63-67) that 
coefficients gij  of: 
 
g z z
g
i j
z z o Lij i j
i j
( , , )
! !
( )ξ = + +
+ =
∑ 2
2
 
 
are given by: 
 
g
G
z zij i j
=
∂ ξ
∂ ∂
2 0 0 0( , , , )
                   i+j=2     
 
while coefficients  vij  of the approximation of v are given by the systems: 
 
[ ]v ri r j I A Hz zij i j= + −
−
( )
( , , , )1 2 0 0 0∂ ξ
∂ ∂     i+j=2                               (A.3 b) 
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Equation (A.3) is in Poincarè normal form. 
Now consider the following equation, equivalent to (A.3): 
 
& ( ) ( )( , )z r z z c z zM j
j
= + ∑ξ ξ1                                                            (A.4)                   
 
where z is a complex variable, and cj ( )ξ  are coefficients. Calculating 
d zz dt( ) / , from (A.4) we obtain: 
 
[ ]d zz dt zz r c zzM j j( ) / Re ( ) Re ( )( )= + ∑2 1ξ ξ                                (A.4 b) 
 
which is equal to zero if z=0 or Re ( ) Re ( )( )r c zzM j
jξ ξ+ ∑ =1 0. In the last 
case, (A.4 b) implies that zz = ≥ε 2 0. If we consider ξ ξ ε= ( ) , that is, we 
express it as a function of ε  which we approximate with the polynomial 
ξ ξ ε ε= ∑ + +1 1M j j Mo( ) , and we substitute it in the last condition, this 
becomes: 
 
Re ( ( )) Re ( ( ))r cM j
jξ ε ξ ε ε+ ∑ =1 2 0                                               (A.5) 
 
Now expand the right hand side of (A.5) in powers of ε . Equating the result 
to zero and considering first o( )ε  and then  o( )ε 2 , we have: 
 
d r
d
Re ( )ξ
ξ ξ ξ1 10 0= ⇒ =  
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and: 
 
d r
d
c
c
d r d
Re ( )
Re ( )
Re ( )
Re ( ) /
ξ
ξ ξ ξ ξ
ξ
ξ ξ2 1 2
10+ = ⇒ = − . 
 
It can then be shown (Hassard et. al., 1981, pp. 45-47) that c1 ( )ξ  is equal 
to: 
 
i r g g g g
g
( Im ( ))2 2
1
3 2
1
20 11 11
2
02
2 21ξ − − −

+  
 
The Poincarè-Bendixon theorem (Hassard et. al., 1981, pag. 36-38) 
applied to (A.4), allows us to state that, given d r dRe ( ) /ξ ξ > 0, the 
stability of the limit cycle of (A.4) depends upon Re ( )c1 ξ : if it is greater 
than zero, the cycle is stable; if it is less than zero, the cycle is unstable. 
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